





THE hasty action at the success of his own iron-clad, and characteristic sneers at English efforts of the same kind, which he passed on the lips of the Federal Secretary, Welles, when the Monitor, getting into a seaway, went down with all hands on board. The result might have shocked, but it could not have surprised, the Federals, who are excellent judges of what fine sea-going models should be, and who knew even better than ourselves that the Monitor had not a single point to recommend her either for emulation abroad or reproduction at home. The secret of her popularity lay entirely in the fact that out of a very large and most costly fleet she was the only vessel that had distinguished herself against the enemy; hence her notorious defects were never canvassed, and she was taken by general consent to be the type and model of the new iron-clad, though she neither steamed nor stored with coal, carried only two guns, and, above all, was so small as to be as unseaworthy as she has since proved to be. Yet, it is not too much to say that when this vessel gained her first and only success the American journals lauded their own surpassing industry, and threatened helpless England as if iron ships were peculiar to the Americans alone, and as if England had not already sent to sea, in the Warrior, the finest, fastest, and strongest vessel of this class the world has yet seen, before a rivet was driven in the Monitor's hull. Already this rage for vessels of the Monitor class has acted most prejudicially on the infant navy of the Federal States. Of the three types which they then hastily adopted, the representative of the Monitor, the *Gales*, has proved an utter failure; the Monitor, as shown in the first broken water she met with in the Ironsides, the type of the third class, has been beaten, tested, and, after the experience gained by the Monitor, is never likely to be tested, in deep water. In the meantime, we have gone on slowly rectifying what was wrong, and extending and enlarging upon plans which we had ourselves proved to be right, until we are gathering round us an iron fleet admitted now even in America to be perfect models of what such ships should be. We have stepped cautiously from vessels like the *Resistance* and *Defence* to vessels like the *West*, and the *Valiant*, to such frigates as the *Windsor*, and the *Prince*, and now again from these to the improved *Warriors*, 7000 ton ships of the *Minotaur*, *Norhamberland*, and *Agincourt* class.

Thus, then, as far as our comparison of the Warrior with the Minotaur has gone, we find that in the latter new class of ironclads we get larger ships of improved rig and proportions, with greater power and not less speed, with a heavier armament, and, above all, a stronger and more complete covering of armour. It is especially in this latter all-important point that the greatest changes are made in the Minotaur class. The armour of the Warrior is 4½ inches thick, the teak plating of the bows being laid transversely to a thickness of 18 inches in the inner skin. This tremendous covering, though, as we know, only over part of the broadside, weighs 950 tons of iron and 350 tons of teak—

For a length of about thirty feet back from the bows no armour is used, but in its stead a massive 54-inch semicircular iron shield extends across this end of the vessel, and is continued down to the level of the main deck. It is at portholes in this shield both on the main and upper decks that two of the heaviest guns used in the service are to be placed, the men working which will be completely protected. There is to be a rifle tower on the upper deck, as the *Warrior*, in case of any attempt at boarding. The alteration in the rig of the new ships, which the Admiralty would have acted wisely in conceding to the other iron frigates, is a great improvement. The one exception long ago from its obvious utility. It was nothing short of ridiculous that because a liner had a top, 200 feet long, only required three masts, there a vessel of 400 should have no more. The Admiralty, however, clung fondly and obstinately to the traditional three spars, and it was not till the *Warrior* went to sea and the difficulties of managing a ship with each of her masts 150 feet apart became so serious they could be no longer overlooked, that routine gave way and a new description of rig was allowed for quite a new description of vessel. There, as we said, to be five masts in the *Minotaur* and her sisters, three square rigged, and two, the first and last, carrying fore and aft canvas only. To each of these spars, both masts and yards, to be made of wrought iron like the Great Eastern's, and, in weight for weight, is stronger than wood, is to be shot away, and which, when shot away, tears itself free and goes down alongside like a deep sea lead, instead of floating astern and fouling the screw with the wreck of shrouds and cordage.

Close under the bows of the Minotaur is the Russian iron frigate of 3500 tons, who is to carry forty guns, and with a powerful iron beak to strike under water any adversary she may be fortunate enough to overtake; but her lines are coarse and full, her bows very heavy, and her horse-power merely auxiliary, being as low as 350. She has the same strength of hull, thickness of armour, and teak backing as the Warrior. Two other iron frigates are also being commenced here—one for the Spanish and one for the Turkish Government. Both these vessels will be upwards of 5000 tons, and coated with 5-inch iron on 10-inch of teak.—*Times*.

By "Historicus," in the Times, January 23)

Addressing the Editor, the writer says:— I observe that a writer in the current number of the *Edinburgh Review* has criticised the doctrine which I ventured to lay down on the subject of "Recognition," in a letter which I wrote to you some time ago. The reviewer contends that the question is one of policy entirely, and not of right. Upon this point, though I entertain the most sincere respect for his opinion, I cannot by any means concur in his reasoning, or admit the facts on which it is founded. I am in a condition to support the propositions for which I have contended from the mouth of an authority which I am sure the *Edinburgh reviewer* will admit to be entitled to the very highest consideration. On the subject of a *League* between the States of Lower Louisiana, in the House of the Senate, I referred to the recognition of the South American Republics—a speech evidently most carefully considered, and replete with that wisdom, knowledge, accuracy, and moderation which are characteristic of an English statesman who still represents to an age which he adorns the *mitis sapientia* *Lati*. The following passage from this remarkable performance is so important and so pertinent that I make no apology for quoting it *in extenso*:—

"My Lords, it is with respect to countries such as I have described that your Lordships are now called upon to determine whether you will advise the Crown to recognise them in the form of independent States—a question which, if it is decided in the affirmative, involves a twofold consideration: first, whether the facts justify the acknowledgment; and, secondly, whether, supposing the right to be established, the expediency of exercising that right without delay is equally clear. My Lords, I may the first point to be considered, and I may say that I have no doubt that it is my duty this year to point out to your Lordships the great advantages which may result from the establishment of South American independence. I hope I shall never stand up in my place in this House to advise the Crown to refuse to recognise any of the States of South America."

consistent with those principles of right, which are paramount to all expediency and compromise that great and universal law of nations, any departure from which, to say the least, is a violation of the public policy, never fails to recoil upon its authors. The important question, therefore, will be my excuse with your benevolence *first* de facto, and *secondly* *de jure* the preliminary question of right. My Lords, I know of no ground upon which we can be certain whether we possess that right but by confirming the object of our instance, whether those States which are dependent, and, secondly, if they are *de facto* independent, whether there be any prospect of the old Government of Spain, or whether we have not the means of recovering so as to possess the advantages she formerly did from them; and, thirdly, if they are *de facto* independent, and there is no prospect of their being so, whether we have the sanction of the mother country, whether they have previously disposed and able to maintain those relations of friendship and alliance which ought to exist between independent and friendly nations. I have no doubt, my Lords, I perceive to be the opinion of the noble Lord opposite, and I am confident he is confirmed in the opinion by the result of the first—namely, whether those States are *de facto* independent—I presume that hardly a question can be raised in your minds, whether we have the sanction of the mother country, the events which have occurred within the last two or three years in that part of the globe, and the absence of all prospect of their being so, whether they have been in a state of civil or forced by military authority, whether exercised by

[illegible]

I pray your readers' careful attention to this extract. It shows first that Lord Lansdowne was clearly of opinion that the question of recognition involved a matter of right, and not merely of policy, as between the original sovereign State and the recognising Powers. Secondly, it is important carefully to observe the facts with reference to the state of the contest in the several provinces, and the action which the English Government thought itself justified in taking thereupon. The speech of Lord Lansdowne explains exactly the situation of affairs, and I have no objection on that point to Mr. Addams' statement, that the Republic of Buenos Ayres alone, at this time, was considered entitled to recognition. The recognition of Columbia was postponed because she had detached her forces in aid of the Peruvian insurgents. The recognition of Chili and Mexico was deferred on account of the defective organisation of their Governments (*vide* Stapleton's "Life of Canning"). But what is most important to remark is that under the circumstances stated by Lord Lansdowne the recognition of Peru was not even entertained, because the contest still subsisted, though, for the reasons set out in the foregoing speech, the ultimate reinstatement of the power of Spain was as clearly hopeless in that as in the other cases. This is a fact of great importance as authoritative decision as it possibly can be conceived on the part of the English Government, that the real test of the right to recognition depends on the establishment of *de facto* independence, and the only legitimate proof of such independence is the cessation of all *bona fide* struggle on the part of the former sovereign.

Thus far the great Whig authority. I will now cite from the same debate the opinion of a Minister to which the Tory journals, which are so clamorous for recognition, will probably pay some regard. The following passage is from the speech of Lord Liverpool, then Prime Minister, who must be accordingly taken as the authoritative exponent on this subject of the English doctrine:—

With regard the question of the recognition of independence, they both agreed that it was to be considered on two grounds—the first, of right; the second, of expediency. That where no right existed there could be no expediency. They agreed that the United States had not had difficulty in declaring what had been his conviction during the year (years?) that the struggle had been going on, and that the United States would not recognize it, unless there could be no right while the contest was actually going on. He knew that our own history proved that other Powers of Europe had acted to the same end. He said that the United States had no right. He was aware of the conduct which the whole House of Bourbon had adopted in the struggle between Great Britain and North American colonies. It was the duty of the United States to follow the same course, what was the justice or policy of that contest, those Powers cut the cord of contention, and, not satisfied with merely recognizing the independence of the colonies, they severed their connection from the parent State. God forbid that, under any circumstances, Great Britain should feel disposed to follow such an example. The question ought to be decided on the basis of right, and not expediency. It is not reconcile it to his mind to take any such step so long as the struggle in arms continued undecided. And while he made that declaration he meant that it should be a solemn declaration.

You will observe that Lord Liverpool takes the same view of the value of the argument by estoppel which I have recently expressed. I hope his sentiments on this point may not be lost on those who profess to be disciples of the party of which he was no long the chief. Sir J. Mackintosh distinctly admits, in his great speech on this subject (*Miscellaneous Works*, 8, p. 20), that the case of the essential point to determine was "whether there was a contest with Spain still pending;" by which, he very justly said, "we must mean such a contest as exhibits some equality of force." Before disputing the propriety of the test, he accepts it, and proceeds to show that the case of those in whose favour he is arguing satisfies it. He says, "If I look on Spanish America as one vast unit, the question of the extension of my argument must rest too simply on the single doubtful." He proceeds to ask, "What is the Spanish strength? A single castle in Mexico, an island on the coast of Chili, and a small army in Upper Peru. It is

this a contest approaching to equality?" And again, "If, on the other hand, we consider the American States as separate, the fact of independence is undisputed, with respect at least to some of them. What doubts can be entertained as to the independence of the immense provinces of Caracas, New Grenada, and Quito, which now form the Republic of Columbia? There a considerable Spanish army has been defeated; all have been either destroyed or expelled from the territory of the Republic; not a Royalist soldier remains. The Republic of Buenos Ayres has an equally undisputed enjoyment of independence. There no Spanish soldier has set his foot for fourteen years." And he concludes this branch of the argument in the following words:—"If, then, we consider these States as one nation, there cannot be said to be any remaining contest. If, on the other hand, we consider these separately, why do we not immediately acquiesce with the prayer of the petition by recognizing the independence of those which we must allow to be in fact independent? Where is the objection to the instantaneous recognition at least of Columbia and Buenos Ayres?" It is clear, then, that Sir J. Mackintosh accepted as the test of an independence entitling to recognition the cessation of all "serious contest." Such is the doctrine on the subject laid down with great precision by English statesmen, and illustrated in practice by a great historical precedent. I cannot understand how the Edinburgh Reviewer, who contends for the somewhat vague definition of a "certain time and spirit and power in maintaining its own rights," accounts upon his hypothesis for the decision of Mr. Canning not to recognize Peru in 1824.

But the Edinburgh Reviewer seeks to fortify his position by the authority of Mr. Wheaton, a writer of whom I desire to speak with the highest and most sincere respect. Upon this subject, however, I am bound to say that the American publicist has not expressed himself with his usual clearness, precision, and consistency. In a letter of the date of November 8th I cited a passage from Mr. Wheaton's work which certainly seemed entirely to bear out the view for which I am contending. It will be found in the *Elements of International Law*, vol. i. p. 92:—

" Until the revolution is consummated, while the civil war involving a contest for the Government continues, other States may remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing to treat the ancient Government as sovereign and the Government *de facto* as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy;—but, as the cause of the party which they believe to have justice on its side. In the latter case, they shall fulfil all its obligations under the law of nations and neither party has any right to complain, provided it maintains an impartial neutrality. In the latter it becomes, of course, the enemy of the party against whom it declares war, and the ally of the other; and, as the positive law of nations forbids the intervention of a third party in a just and an unjust war, the intervention of States entitled to all the rights of war against the guilty party."

It is certainly a just inference from this passage that Mr. Wheaton's opinion is that while "the civil war is living a contest for the Government continues" other States have only two alternatives; one is that of remaining neutral, in which situation it is necessary that "it should continue to treat the ancient Government as sovereign and the Government *de facto* as entitled to the rights of war"; the other is to espouse the side of one, and so to become ally, and the enemy of the other belligerent. "To continue to treat the ancient Government as sovereign *de facto* while the civil war continues" is to "fulfil the obligations of the foreign State under the Law of Nations"; the question of recognition is clearly in the view of Mr. Wheaton one of law, and not of policy only. But in order to deal fairly with the reviewer, I must assume that, in quoting Mr. Wheaton, he relies on the following passage at page 97:—

It has been already stated that while the contest for violently confine and the civil war rages the nations may be able to ally themselves in the maintenance of rights which war gives to public enemies. We may acknowledge the independence of the new State, forming with it a new confederacy, and still ally ourselves in the treaty with one party or the other. In the first case neither party has any right to complain, so long as the other nation maintains its neutrality, and does not attempt to interfere with the treaty; the last two involve questions which seem to belong rather to the field of politics than of law; but the practice of the neutrality and not furnishing an inevitable rule for the solution of these questions, will at least stand more tight upon them.

It is, perhaps, not very easy to reconcile these two passages with one another, and there is a somewhat inconsistent statement in the second which is somewhat unattractive. It appears, however, that in Mr. Wheaton's opinion the part of an "impartial neutrality" is to "abide the event of the contest;" and this is the only conduct which Mr. Wheaton certainly says "neither party has a right to complain of." He places the "acknowledgment of independence" and the "joining in alliance" with one of the belligerents in another category, and treats them both as a question of politics rather than of law. But, as "joining in alliance" would certainly be a ground of war, perhaps he means that the "acknowledgment of independence," without "abiding the event of the contest," would be in itself a ground of war, and that, consequently, both belong rather to the province of politics than of law. And possibly the somewhat lax practice of his own country on these subjects may have betrayed this eminent writer into statements less precise than might be desirable in a scientific treatise.

On the subject of the "practice of nations," to which tribunal Mr. Wheaton refers the question, his brief summary is not satisfactory. It will be found that his account of the recognition of the South American Republics, so far as he states it to be solely a question of expediency, and not of right, does not coincide with the views of the English statesman I have cited. His treatment also of the important precedent of the English declaration of war in 1778 is by no means accurate.

It is alleged that the English declaration of war against France in 1778 was not founded, nor could it be justified, upon the ground of the simple recognition of the American insurgents by the negotiation of a treaty of commerce. The relation of this transaction to the present argument is so important that it is worth while to ascertain with accuracy the true state of the facts. The Edinburgh Reviewer upon this point does not agree with Mr. Wheaton, and I have the misfortune to differ from both. The Edinburgh Reviewer is, I think, right in condemning the opinion of Mr. Wheaton, that the treaty of alliance concluded

between France and the revolted colonies would not have been a good ground for a declaration of war on the part of Great Britain. But he is wrong in affirming that the offensive and defensive treaty of alliance of 1778 was the ground of the English declaration of hostilities. Both the *review* and Mr. Wheaton have been misled by assuming Gibbon's celebrated piece *justly* to be the contemporary statement of the causes of the war. A closer attention to the facts of the case will show that it is not the case. Gibbon's *Review*, which will be found in the *Annual Register* for 1780, is without date; but it is not difficult to discover the proximate time of its composition. It was written by order of the English Government, though apparently not published by authority.

as an answer to the French document setting forth the complaints of the Court of Versailles, which appeared in 1792. Gibbon became a Lord of the Treasury in the summer of that year, and it is probable that his memoir first saw the light towards the end of 1779. An amusing account of this job which the great historian undertook will be found in his autobiography. This paper, written, as we have seen, nearly two years after the declaration of war, would naturally contain a number of grievances which were not known or thought of when the war originally broke out, and, among others, the offensive alliances concluded between France and the insurgent provinces in anticipation of the war. The real causes of the war are to be sought in the transactions out of which it immediately arose. They will be found to be these:—On March 18, 1776, the Marquis de Noailles, the French Ambassador in London, communicated to the English Government the conclusion of a treaty of commerce between the Court of Versailles and the thirteen States of America. The note, which accompanied the treaty, will be found in the *Annual Register* for 1776: vide also *Adolphus's History*, vol. ii, p. 544. On the 17th of the same month the King's Message was brought down to Parliament, announcing that the English Ambassador was ordered to leave France. I quote the very words, in order to show that the sole and exclusive ground of the English declaration of war was the recognition of independence of the insurgents, and the negotiation with them of the commercial treaty, and made no sort of allusion to any other ground of quarrel with

His Majesty having been informed, by order of the French King, that a treaty of amity and commerce has been concluded between the King of France and certain persons employed by his Majesty in the United States of America, has judged it necessary to direct that a copy of the declaration delivered by the French Ambassador to his Majesty, in relation to the said treaty, be shown to the House of Commons; and at the same time to enquire into the said treaty, and in consequence of, in consequence of this official communication on the part of the Court of France, to his Majesty is persuaded that the justice and good faith of his conduct towards foreign Powers, and the sincerity of his intentions to preserve the tranquillity of Europe, will be acknowledged by the House of Commons. His Majesty trusts that he shall not stand responsible for the disturbance of that tranquillity if the said House shall be called to meet on unprovoked and unjust an aggression on the honour and independence and the essential interests of his kingdom, contrary to the solemn assurances, subversive of the law of nature, and injurious to the rights of every foreign Power in Europe.

Here, then, is the precise and definite declaration of the English Government that the sole and sufficient ground of the war they are about to declare is the negotiation of a treaty of commerce, and the recognition thereby implied of the insurgent provinces,—a course which is here pronounced to be "subversive of the law of nations."

That this was not merely the official pretext, but the real ground of the war, clearly appears from a private letter of Gibbon. The following passage will be found in a letter to Holroyd, of the 23rd of February, 1778:—"It is positively asserted, both in private and in Parliament, and not contradicted by the Ministers, that on the 5th of this month a treaty of commerce (which naturally leads to war) was signed at Paris with the Independent States of America." It is idle, in the face of these documents, to maintain that the English Government did not think the negotiation of a treaty of commerce with the rebels, and the recognition of their independence thereby implied, a sufficient ground of war by itself, or that they in reality meant to rest their declaration of hostilities on any other ground.

It is suggested, indeed, that the Government of the day must have known of other and better grounds for the serious measure of declaring war against France, which might be found in the secret and perfidious machinations by which her agents at that occasion were disgracefully distinguished from the rest of the world. It is an inadmissible speculation in the face of these conclusive documents. It may be assumed that when one Government declares war against another it gives the first reasons within its knowledge and at its disposal to justify its conduct. We understand that a nation may be indirectly actuated by a variety of motives of good pretence. But it is not consistent with common sense to suppose that the English Government in 1778, having plenty of better grounds for their declaration of war in the background, preferred to rest it on an insufficient reason. They rested it, as we have seen, exclusively on the communication of the commercial treaty and on the grounds which the Ministry thought their best and sufficient justification, in which opinion I submit they were perfectly well founded.

The Edinburgh Reviewer has fallen into a most important error on this point. He says that the treaty of 1778 justified a declaration of war by Great Britain, because it "provided that in the event of war the two States should make common cause against Great Britain." But the treaty of 1778, which was the ground of the war, contained no such clause. The reviewer overlooked the important circumstance that there were two treaties of 1778, which would be found together in Martens, vol. II., one, a treaty of commerce, which was that communicated to the English Government by the Marquis de Noailles; the other, a secret treaty of alliance, which was made because the parties knew that the treaty of commerce would inevitably lead to war, but was kept back till it was divulged after the declaration of war. The clause to which the reviewer alludes is in the second treaty of alliance, which was not communicated, and which, consequently, was not the ground of the declaration of war. It is not in the treaty of commerce, which we have seen was the exclusive matter relied on by the King in his message to Parliament, which for the purpose of an international argument must be taken to be the true cause of the war.

It may be surmised that the English Government knew or suspected the existence of the treaty of alliance. And, indeed, this appears from Lord Stormont's letters, *vide* Lord Mahon's *Hist.*, vol. vi, App., p. xxiii. Though they may have suspected it, they had no such cognizance of it as would enable them to found upon it a cause of hostilities; they, therefore, wisely confined themselves to the fact of recognition and the communication of the commercial treaty, which they held to be all sufficient for their justification.

What, then, are the conclusions to be deduced from these authentic and binding historical precedents? First, that in 1778 the English Government treated what the Edinburgh Reviewer calls the "moral recognition" of an insurgent province during the pendency of the contest by the negotiation of a commercial treaty as a breach of neutrality, "subversive of the law of nations," and affording a justifiable ground of war. Second, that the United States Government, while the struggle still continues, does not recognize the insurgents by a foreign State as an international wrong to the original Sovereign. Upon precisely the same grounds the leading statesmen of both parties in 1824 declared that in order to the recognition of the South American Republics it was necessary

to establish, not as a question of policy only, but of right, that the contest was substantially at issue. They did not think themselves at liberty to speculate on the question whether the efforts still maintained by the ancient Government would or would not in the end prove successful. They acted, and thought themselves at liberty to act, only in those cases when the independence of the insurgents was actually established by the real cessation of the contest. As I have shown in my last letter, the case of Texas, so far from being an exception to this rule, is only a fresh illustration of the principle the more valuable because the more recent. For these reasons I must express my entire dissent from the opinion of the Edinburgh Reviewer, that the question of recognition is one of policy and not of law, and I must equally protest against the proposition put forth at page 298 of that publication, that the "establishment of diplomatic relations with rebellious States, accompanied by treaties of commerce and amity," while the contest for Government still subsists in full force, "affords no legitimate ground for complaint" to the ancient Sovereign.

While everything connected with the construction, rig, and ornament of our ships of war is in a state of revision, it is but just to the crews of these ships, that the system of victualling should also be revised, all rules swept away, and the whole system based on principle, in accordance with modern ideas. We are much pleased to find that a step in this direction is about to be taken by the Admiralty with reference to the victualling ships.

—so far as it relates to meat and vegetable, and contrast it as they can, with regard to preparation and nutritive properties. In drawing this contrast there is not the least intention to disparage on the present or late Board of Admiration, or, on the contrary, great praise is done to the present Board for the steps they have already taken to do away with the use of salted and pickled meats, and to encourage them if they carry out the new order of things. The seamen and marines are now fed exclusively upon beef and pork—that is, they can have boiled salt beef, or fresh beef, and boiled salt pork, but all meat is boiled, and the cooking is done in the most judicious manner. There is no salted meat, and the ship's commandment to their paying-off officers is therefore null and void. There is a chance, certainly, of a man obtaining a baked dish of fresh meat when in harbor, but this is not the rule, and the sailor must be content with the salted meats, though he may

Accommodation in the cooking galleys fixed on board our ships (this meat cannot be obtained finer than the time stated), the use of the existing vessels is chiefly monopolized for the messes of the ship's officers. Taking the average of ships in commission, it will be found that nine out of the twelve in now of the year are passed in harbour, and during this period fresh beef is served out to the crews five days out of the seven. The meat is weighed out and cut up into junkies under proper supervision, and handed over to the ship's cook, who bundles it, according to old usage, into the ship's coppers with a small quan-

lity of vegetable, and boils the whole undisturbed to a kind of soup that would be unacceptable if not for the few vegetables in it. The mania at the time was for a kind of pale, watery, starchy substance which is no longer nutritive. The soup, with a few scraps of vegetables, is a capital thing in its way, but if people alone were compelled to live on it, there would be nothing but boiled turnips, but not only were the people not allowed to eat on a praiseworthy change of diet. The allowance by Admiralty regulation of vegetables three times a day to seamen on a ship, is half a pound of vegetables to each man per man. In taking up half a pound of vegetables a day, the man is not allowed to take any other food, and the result is that the vegetables point out that a good sized potato would weigh the half-pound; and, secondly, that a handkerchief full of bicuit can always be exchanged for a new lot of soup. The board of the hospital, however, was undergoing a painful servitude, six times, in one of our ordinary pots, for the first four years of their servitude are half-boiled meats and soups. As their own situation, how-

ing, in general, be probably injured if such a vessel were to be wrecked. The crew of the *Albatross* for the last two years, get baked beef or mutton two days in the week. They are allowed the same quantity of vegetables and fruit as the crew of the *Albatross* receive; half a pound per day; but in addition, the crew, and, therefore, in excess of what is allowed to the crews of her Majesty's ships, a convict also receives a daily allowance of bread and butter, and is well-baked. Such are contrivances parts of the existing system of victualing the men trained and trusted to fight the battles of the country.

To remedy this state of things, and give a greater variety to the seaman's dinner, a plan has been submitted for the consideration of the Lords of the Admiralty by an officer of the *Albatross*, viz., that the Victualling Department, which has been most favourably criticised by their lordships, who have, we understand, been in the habit of visiting the ships, should send one of the ships in the home ports; and met probably the *Hannibal*, screw liner at Portsmouth, to stop for the reception of a few fresh provisions returning to the fleet from the coast, on the proposed plan, in order that it may be fully tasted and reported upon by the staff of the Port of Admiralty.

It is not, however, to be supposed that the *Albatross* to send a first-class ship is to the Admiralty about £1000 each. It is, therefore, evident that an immense expenditure of material and labour can only result from an enormous expense being incurred by the victualling of a galley. If the present galley can have a table

aerocommunication increased, it being essential in all other respects that supplementary aid is affixed to the system with regard to the construction of the manna. The way in which this it is proposed to be accomplished is to erect an oven about four feet forward of the ship's upperworks, the oven being of brick or stone, and measuring six feet wide, and two feet in depth. This oven will contain four shelves of wire trays, so as to equalize the heat from top to bottom, which may require the men to move the trays up and down during the cooking process. A jacket, or flue, encircles the oven from a small fire underneath, the smoke being carried off by a funnel communicating with the larger funnel of the galley. The hot air thus taken away will be sufficient to bake 360 men. Again, take the instance of a ship at sea, foreign station, says the Pacific, in which the bread is short. Barrels of American flour, the best bread-making material known, are on board, but no yeast of any quantity and at moderate cost. The supplementary oven would, therefore, under such circumstances, afford a means of giving a ship's company good, wholesome food, instead of the coarse, starchy, unpalatable biscuit to be allowed on the spot, on which they must be otherwise fed. The exact differences between soft, fresh bread and rotten or stinky biscuit on a distant station in the Pacific Ocean, is well known to those who have served in such latitudes. In addition, however, to providing our ships' crews with the means of baking as well as when eating their fresh beef, and with fresh, clean water, as before mentioned, on foreign stations, the proposed scheme is still farther. It is proposed that the men shall be allowed not the half pint of porridge of the convict, weighed after boiling, but 1 lb

pound of potatoes with his fresh meat, in addition to the pound of butter, shallots, and onion, and the mutton should be supplied on certain days at harbor. In lieu of beef. It is estimated that the cost of this additional allowance of potatoes, and the occasional substitution of mutton for beef, would increase the cost of outfitting our sailing vessels, and the crew's food, by about one-third more, by which, if we were to put the question of the men's comfort and enjoyment aside, and look upon it from a merely sanitary point of view. The cost of a supplementary oven which would bake sufficient bread for 25 men, would be \$100, and the cost of the fuel would be \$25. If, however, the present Board carries out the proposed plan for improving the supply and cooking of provisions for the crews of her

Majority's ships, they will do more to render the Royal Navy service popular with seamen than has been done by any previous measure.—*Hunter.*

**STREAM DROGHERS FOR THE HUNTER, WILLIAM PATTERSON RIVERS.**—The H. B. R. N. S. N. 3. Commissioners of the Hunter River, who, by the provisions of the act of 1865, are empowered to improve the produce on the Hunter, William, and Paterson Rivers, contracted, some time ago, with Messrs. P. N. Russell and Co., for the construction of a steam tug, and a number of facilities, to which it is understood, is now a very forward state, and the building expected to be enabled to complete her in a few weeks from this time. Being of a very light draught of water, and fitted with a screw propeller, and other modern facilities for loading and discharging by means of a steam discharging winch and derrick, she will no doubt prove of great advantage to the service of the Hunter River, and thus promote the development of the resources of the fertile district watered by this river.—*Maitland Mercury.*

[illegible]























The amount of Customs duties paid to-day is as follows :—

The Northern export arrived this evening with the following quantities of gold dust. From Rocky River, 819 ozs. 16 dwts.; Nandle, 515 ozs.; Lamworth, 26 ozs.; Scona, 60 ozs. Total 1420 ozs. 16 dwts.

and have not yet arrived:—  
Persia, 1684 tons, from London: Printed cottons, 1955; millinery, £200; hosiery, £480; haberdashery, £450; apparel, £650; carpets and rugs, £800; saddlery, £320; books, £50; paper, 210 cut; upholstery, £143; iron bedsteads,

Princess of Wales, 1100 tons, from London: Plain cottons, £1305; coloured ditto, £162; printed ditto, £170; woollens, £1690; flannels, £338; linen, £190; cotton and woollens, £270; silk and velvets, £450; ribbons, £140; millinery, £211; hose &c., £438.

caudex, 22 cwt.; foreleg ditto, 125 cwt.; sulphuric  
and other acid, 55 cwt.; boys; figs, 46 cwt.; curraway  
seeds, 4 cwt.; sugar, 3 cwt.; whiting, 15 ton;  
cement and plaster of Paris, 520 barrels. Total de-  
clared value of cargo, £35,561.  
Ironside, 898 tons, from London; Woolley and

ditto, in bulk, 186 gallons; red wine, 912 gallons;  
beer, in bulk, 701 barrels; ditto, in glass, 114 barrel;  
assorted oilmen's stores, £6; groceries, £197; starch,  
£39; white salt, 60 tons; carbonate and bicarbonate  
of soda, 20 cwt; almonds, 9 cwt.; confectionery,  
\$206; apothecary, same \$218; shipping, 33 ships.

upholstery, \$30; brushware, \$71; turnery, \$422;  
plated and papier mache goods, \$260; pianos,  
\$450; cutlery, \$5; hollowware, \$230; general  
hardware, \$830; hoop iron, 7 tons; gal-  
vanized iron, 17 tons; copper, 1 ton; nails, 12 tons;  
wire and wire rope, 1 ton; linseed oil, 800 gallons;

1920 gallons; British spirits, in glass, 892 gallons;  
ditto, in bulk, 1764 gallons; white wine, 1296 gallons;  
beer, in bulk, 639 barrels; ditto, in glass, 223 barrels;  
malt, 200 quarters; hops, 29 cwt; assorted oilmen's  
stores, \$1188; sardines, 75 cwt.; salmon, 5 cwt.;  
vinegar, 1250 gallons; groceries, £25; arrowroot, 10

\$455; woollens, \$220; Baane's, \$462; linen, \$190; cotton and woollens, \$90; millinery, \$473; hosiery, \$1920; haberdashery, \$1424; apparel, \$8320; blankets, \$986; carpets and rugs, \$1106; straw hats, \$85; felt do and caps, \$34; shawls and mantles, \$76; wrought leather, \$1720; saddlery \$100; books,

\$20; holloware, \$65; fire-arms, \$78; general hardware, \$2177; bar and rod iron, 66 tons; sheet iron, 19 tons; galvanized iron, 2 tons; sheet lead, 15 tons; copper, 24 tons; tin plates, \$52; nails, 23 tons; zinc, 6 tons; steel, 1 cwt.; linseed oil, 60 gallons; rape oil, 100 gallons; turpentine, 100 gallons; naphtha, 300

machines, 250; sawn wood, 25 tons; gunpowder, 20 cwt.; blacking, 25 barrels; brandy, 7782 galls; rum, 4014 gallons; Geneva, 688 gallons; cordials, 1000 gallons; British spirits, in glass, 960 gallons; ditto, in bulk, 769 gallons; red wine, 168 gallons; white wine, 1057 gallons; beer, in bulk, 465 barrels; *Nevee* in bulk, 126 gallons.

groats, 30 cwt.; oatmeal, 200 cwt.; chicory, 60 cwt.; other alkalis, 23 cwt.; candles, 44 cwt.; foreign ditto, 121 cwt.; soap, 9 cwt.; perfumery, £561; sulphuric and other acids, 14 cwt.; currants, 66 cwt.; caraway seed, 62 cwt.; liquors, 1 inc. 4 cwt.; ginger 40 cwt.; confectionery, £90.

woolens; **£33**; silk and velvets, **£160**; millinery, **££81**; hosiery, **£626**; haberdashery, **£267**; umbrellas, **£11**; cotton and linen shirts, **£132**; apparel, **£3244**; blankets, **£144**; bed covers, **£113**; felt hats and caps, **£660**; shawls and mantles, **£140**; wrought

cases: tobacco pipes, 15 cases; tools, \$77; cutlery, \$96; saws, \$86; spades, \$32; firearms, \$21; general hardware, \$176; bar and rod iron, 8 tons; hoop iron, 25 tons; sheet lead, 38 tons; pipe lead, 7 tons; shot, 1 ton; copper, 12 tons; ingot iron, 1 cwt.; nails, 6 tons; wire, and wire rope, 34 tons; zinc, 2 tons.

blacking, 1 barrel; tobacco, 1394 lbs.; brandy, 2977  
gallons; cordials, 410 gallons; red wine, 253 gallons;  
beer, in bulk, 630 barrels; ditto, in glass, 230 barrels;  
provisions, \$300; cheese, 119 cwt.; bacon and hams,  
155 cwt.; assorted oilmen's stores, \$229; groceries,

**LORD DUNDREARY IN VICTORIA.**  
HIS MEETING WITH THE HON. FREDERICK DUNDREARY  
ALIAS "SAM."

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